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Abstract
Woo and Lam propose correspondence assertions for specifying authenticity proper-
ties of security protocols. The only prior work on checking correspondence assertions
depends on model-checking and is limited to ﬁnite-state systems. We propose a de-
pendent type and eﬀect system for checking correspondence assertions. Since it
is based on type-checking, our method is not limited to ﬁnite-state systems. This
paper presents our system in the simple and general setting of the π-calculus. We
show how to type-check correctness properties of example communication protocols
based on secure channels. In a related paper, we extend our system to the more
complex and speciﬁc setting of checking cryptographic protocols based on encrypted
messages sent over insecure channels.
1 Introduction
Correspondence Assertions To a ﬁrst approximation, a correspondence
assertion about a communication protocol is an intention that follows the
pattern:
If one principal ever reaches a certain point in a protocol, then some other
principal has previously reached some other matching point in the protocol.
We record such intentions by annotating the program representing the
protocol with labelled assertions of the form beginL or endL. These assertions
have no eﬀect at runtime, but notionally indicate that a principal has reached
a certain point in the protocol. The following more accurately states the
intention recorded by these annotations:
If the program embodying the protocol ever asserts end L, then there is a
distinct previous assertion of begin L.
c©2001 Published by Elsevier Science B. V.
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Woo and Lam [27] introduce correspondence assertions to state intended
properties of authentication protocols based on cryptography. Consider a
protocol where a principal a generates a new session key k and transmits it
to b. We intend that if a run of b ends a key exchange believing that it has
received key k from a, then a generated k as part of a key exchange intended
for b. We record this intention by annotating a’s generation of k by the label
begin 〈a, b, k〉, and b’s reception of k by the label end 〈a, b, k〉.
A protocol can fail a correspondence assertion because of several kinds of
bug. One kind consists of those bugs that cause the protocol to go wrong
without any external interference. Other kinds are bugs where an unreliable
or malicious network or participant causes the protocol to fail.
This Paper We show in this paper that correctness properties expressed by
correspondence assertions can be proved by type-checking. We embed corre-
spondence assertions in a concurrent programming language (the π-calculus
of Milner, Parrow, and Walker [18]) and present a new type and eﬀect system
that guarantees safety of well-typed assertions. We show several examples of
how correspondence assertions can be proved by type-checking.
Woo and Lam’s paper introduces correspondence assertions but provides
no techniques for proving them. Clarke and Marrero [4] use correspondence
assertions to specify properties of e-commerce protocols, such as authoriza-
tions of transactions. To the best of our knowledge, the only previous work
on checking correspondence assertions is a project by Marrero, Clarke, and
Jha [17] to apply model-checking techniques to ﬁnite state versions of security
protocols. Since our work is based on type-checking, it is not limited to ﬁnite
state systems. Moreover, type-checking is compositional: we can verify com-
ponents in isolation, and know that their composition is safe, without having
to verify the entire system. Unlike Marrero, Clarke, and Jha’s work, however,
the system of the present paper does not deal with cryptographic primitives,
and nor does it deal with an arbitrary opponent. Still, in another paper [9],
we adapt our type and eﬀect system to the setting of the spi-calculus [1],
an extension of the π-calculus with abstract cryptographic primitives. This
adaptation can show, moreover, that properties hold in the presence of an
arbitrary untyped opponent.
A technical report [10] includes proofs omitted from this paper.
Review of The Untyped π-Calculus Milner, Parrow, and Walker’s π-
calculus is a concurrent formalism to which many kinds of concurrent com-
putation may be reduced. Its simplicity makes it an attractive vehicle for
developing the ideas of this paper, while its generality suggests they may be
widely applicable. Its basic data type is the name, an unguessable identiﬁer
for a communications channel. Computation is based on the exchange of mes-
sages, tuples of names, on named channels. Programming in the π-calculus is
based on the following constructs (written, unusually, with keywords, for the
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sake of clarity). The rest of the paper contains many examples. An output
process out x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 represents a message 〈y1, . . . , yn〉 sent on the channel
x. An input process inp x(z1, . . . , zn);P blocks till it ﬁnds a message sent on
the channel x, reads the names in the message into the variables z1, . . . , zn,
and then runs P . The process P | Q is the parallel composition of the two pro-
cesses P and Q; the two may run independently or communicate on shared
channels. The name generation process new(x);P generates a fresh name,
calls it x, then runs P . Unless P reveals x, no other process can use this fresh
name. The replication process repeat P behaves like an unbounded parallel
array of replicas of P . The process stop represents inactivity; it does nothing.
Finally, the conditional if x = y then P else Q compares the names x and y.
If they are the same it runs P ; otherwise it runs Q.
2 Correspondence Assertions, by Example
This section introduces the idea of deﬁning correspondence assertions by an-
notating code with begin- and end-events. We give examples of both safe code
and of unsafe code, that is, of code that satisﬁes the correspondence assertions
induced by its annotations, and of code that does not.
A transmit-acknowledge handshake is a standard communications idiom,
easily expressed in the π-calculus: along with the actual message, the sender
transmits an acknowledgement channel, upon which the receiver sends an
acknowledgement. We intend that:
During a transmit-acknowledge handshake, if the sender receives an ac-
knowledgment, then the receiver has obtained the message.
Correspondence assertions can express this intention formally. Suppose
that a and b are the names of the sender and receiver, respectively. We
annotate the code of the receiver b with a begin-assertion at the point after
it has received the message msg . We annotate the code of the sender a with
an end-assertion at the point after it has received the acknowledgement. We
label both assertions with the names of the principals and the transmitted
message, 〈a, b,msg〉. Hence, we assert that if after sending msg to b, the
sender a receives an acknowledgement, then a distinct run of b has received
msg .
Suppose that c is the name of the channel on which principal b receives
messages from a. Here is the π-calculus code of the annotated sender and
receiver:
Rcver(a, b, c)
∆
=
inp c(msg , ack);
begin 〈a, b,msg〉;
out ack〈〉
Snder(a, b, c)
∆
=
new(msg); new(ack);
out c〈msg , ack〉; inp ack();
end 〈a, b,msg〉
The sender creates a fresh message msg and a fresh acknowledgement channel
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ack , sends the two on the channel c, waits for an acknowledgement, and then
asserts an end-event labelled 〈a, b,msg〉.
The receiver gets the message msg and the acknowledgement channel ack
oﬀ c, asserts a begin-event labelled 〈a, b,msg〉, and sends an acknowledgement
on ack .
We say a program is safe if it satisﬁes the intentions induced by the begin-
and end-assertions. More precisely, a program is safe just if for every run of
the program and for every label L, there is a distinct begin-event labelled L
preceding every end-event labelled L. (We formalize this deﬁnition in Sec-
tion 5.)
Here are three combinations of our examples: two safe, one unsafe.
new(c);
Snder(a, b, c) |
Rcver(a, b, c)
(Example 1: safe)
Example 1 uses one instance of the sender and one instance of the receiver
to represent a single instance of the protocol. The restriction new(c); makes
the channel c private to the sender and the receiver. This assembly is safe; its
only run correctly implements the handshake protocol.
new(c);
Snder(a, b, c) |
Snder(a, b, c) |
repeat Rcver(a, b, c)
(Example 2: safe)
Example 2 uses two copies of the sender—representing two attempts by a single
principal a to send a message to b—and a replicated copy of the receiver—
representing the principal b willing to accept an unbounded number of mes-
sages. Again, this assembly is safe; any run consists of an interleaving of two
correct handshakes.
new(c);
Snder(a, b, c) |
Snder(a′, b, c) |
repeat Rcver(a, b, c)
(Example 3: unsafe)
Example 3 is a variant on Example 2, where we keep the replicated receiver
b, but change the identity of one of the senders, so that the two senders
represent two diﬀerent principals a and a′. These two principals share a single
channel c to the receiver. Since the identity a of the sender is a parameter
of Rcver(a, b, c) rather than being explicitly communicated, this assembly is
unsafe. There is a run in which a′ generates msg and ack , and sends them to b;
b asserts a begin-event labelled 〈a, b,msg〉 and outputs on ack ; then a′ asserts
an end-event labelled 〈a′, b,msg〉. This end-event has no corresponding begin-
event so the assembly is unsafe, reﬂecting the possibility that the receiver can
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be mistaken about the identity of the sender.
3 Typing Correspondence Assertions
3.1 Types and Eﬀects
Our type and eﬀect system is based on the idea of assigning types to names
and eﬀects to processes. A type describes what operations are allowed on a
name, such as what messages may be communicated on a channel name. An
eﬀect describes the collection of labels of events the process may end while
not itself beginning. We compute eﬀects based on the intuition that end-
events are accounted for by preceding begin-events; a begin-event is a credit
while an end-event is a debit. According to this metaphor, the eﬀect of a
process is an upper bound on the debt a process may incur. If we can assign
a process the empty eﬀect, we know all of its end-events are accounted for
by begin-events. Therefore, we know that the process is safe, that is, its
correspondence assertions are true.
An essential ingredient of our typing rules is the idea of attaching a latent
eﬀect to each channel type. We allow any process receiving oﬀ a channel to
treat the latent eﬀect as a credit towards subsequent end-events. This is sound
because we require any process sending on a channel to treat the latent eﬀect
as a debit that must be accounted for by previous begin-events. Latent eﬀects
are at the heart of our method for type-checking events begun by one process
and ended by another.
The following table describes the syntax of types and eﬀects. As in most
versions of the π-calculus, we make no lexical distinction between names and
variables, ranged over by a, b, c, x, y, z. An event label, L, is simply a tuple of
names. Event labels identify the events asserted by begin- and end-assertions.
An eﬀect, e, is a multiset, that is, an unordered list, of event labels, written
as [L1, . . . , Ln]. A type, T , takes one of two kinds. The ﬁrst kind, Name, is the
type of pure names, that is, names that only support equality operations, but
cannot be used as channels. We use Name as the type of names that identify
principals, for instance. The second kind, Ch(x1:T1, . . . , xn:Tn)e, is a type of
a channel communicating n-tuples of names, of types T1, . . . , Tn, with latent
eﬀect e. The names x1, . . . , xn are bound; the scope of each xi consists of
the types Ti+1, . . . , Tn, and the latent eﬀect e. We identify types up to the
consistent renaming of bound names.
Names, Event Labels, Eﬀects, and Types:
a, b, c, x, y, z names, variables
L ::= 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 event label: tuple of names
e ::= [L1, . . . , Ln] eﬀect: multiset of event labels
T ::= type
Name pure name
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Ch(x1:T1, . . . , xn:Tn)e channel with latent eﬀect e
For example:
• Ch()[ ], a synchronization channel (that is, a channel used only for synchro-
nization) with no latent eﬀect.
• Ch(a:Name)[〈b〉], a channel for communicating a pure name, costing [〈b〉] to
senders and paying [〈b〉] to receivers, where b is a ﬁxed name.
• Ch(a:Name)[〈a〉], a channel for communicating a pure name, costing [〈a〉]
to senders and paying [〈a〉] to receivers, where a is the name communicated
on the channel.
• Ch(a:Name, b:Ch()[〈a〉])[ ], a channel with no latent eﬀect for communicating
pairs of the form a, b, where a is a pure name, and b is the name of a syn-
chronization channel, costing [〈a〉] to senders and paying [〈a〉] to receivers.
The following is a convenient shorthand for the lists of typed variable decla-
rations found in channel types:
Notation for Typed Variables:
x:T
∆
= x1:T1, . . . , xn:Tn where x = x1, . . . , xn and T = T1, . . . , Tn

∆
= () the empty list
The following equations deﬁne the the sets of free names of our syntax
as follows: variable declarations, fn(:)
∆
= ∅ and fn(x:T , x:T )
∆
= fn(x:T ) ∪
(fn(T )−{x}); types, fn(Name) ∆= ∅ and fn(Ch(x:T )e) ∆= fn(x:T )∪(fn(e)−{x});
event labels, fn(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) ∆= {x1, . . . , xn}; and events, fn([L1, . . . , L1]) ∆=
fn(L1) ∪ · · · ∪ fn(Ln).
For any of these forms of syntax, we write −{x←y} for the operation of
capture-avoiding substitution of the name y for each free occurrence of the
name x. We write −{x←y}, where x = x1, . . . , xn and y = y1, . . . , yn for the
iterated substitution −{x1←y1} · · · {xn←yn}.
3.2 Syntax of our Typed π-Calculus
We explained the informal semantics of begin- and end-assertions in Section 2,
and of the other constructs in Section 1.
Processes:
P,Q,R ::= process
out x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 polyadic asynchronous output
inp x(y1:T1, . . . , yn:Tn);P polyadic input
if x = y then P else Q conditional
new(x:T );P name generation
P | Q composition
repeat P replication
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stop inactivity
begin L;P begin-assertion
end L;P end-assertion
There are two name binding constructs: input and name generation. In
an input process inp x(y1:T1, . . . , yn:Tn);P , each name yi is bound, with scope
consisting of Ti+1, . . . , Tn, and P . In a name restriction new(x:T );P , the
name x is bound; its scope is P . We write P{x←y} for the outcome of a
capture-avoiding substitution of the name y for each free occurrence of the
name x in the process P . We identify processes up to the consistent renaming
of bound names. We let fn(P ) be the set of free names of a process P . We
sometimes write an output as out x〈y〉 where y = y1, . . . , yn, and an input
as inp x(y:T );P , where y:T is a variable declaration written in the notation
introduced in the previous section. We write out x〈y〉;P as a shorthand for
out x〈y〉 | P .
3.3 Intuitions for the Type and Eﬀect System
As a prelude to our formal typing rules, we present the underlying intuitions.
Recall the intuition that end-events are costs to be accounted for by begin-
events. When we say a process P has eﬀect e, it means that e is an upper
bound on the begin-events needed to precede P to make the whole process
safe. In other words, if P has eﬀect [L1, . . . , Ln] then beginL1; · · · ; beginLn;P
is safe.
Typing Assertions An assertion beginL;P pays for one end-event labelled
L in P ; so if P is a process with eﬀect e, then begin L;P is a process with
eﬀect e−[L], that is, the multiset e with one occurrence of L deleted. So we
have a typing rule of the form:
P : e ⇒ begin L;P : e−[L]
If P is a process with eﬀect e, then endL;P is a process with eﬀect e+[L],
that is, the concatenation of e and [L]. We have a rule:
P : e ⇒ end L;P : e+[L]
Typing Name Generation and Concurrency The eﬀect of a name gen-
eration process new(x:T );P , is simply the eﬀect of P . To prevent scope con-
fusion, we forbid x from occurring in this eﬀect.
P : e, x /∈ fn(e) ⇒ new(x:T );P : e
The eﬀect of a concurrent composition of processes is the multiset union
of the constituent processes.
P : eP , Q : eQ ⇒ P | Q : eP+eQ
The inactive process asserts no end-events, so its eﬀect is empty.
125
Gordon and Jeffrey
stop : [ ]
The replication of a process P behaves like an unbounded array of repli-
cas of P . If P has a non-empty eﬀect, then its replication would have an
unbounded eﬀect, which could not be accounted for by preceding begin-
assertions. Therefore, to type repeat P we require P to have an empty eﬀect.
P : [ ] ⇒ repeat P : [ ]
Typing Communications We begin by presenting the rules for typing
communications on monadic channels with no latent eﬀect, that is, those with
types of the form Ch(y:T )[ ]. The communicated name has type T . An output
out x〈z〉 has empty eﬀect. An input inp x(y:T );P has the same eﬀect as P .
Since the input variable in the process and in the type are both bound, we
may assume they are the same variable y.
x : Ch(y:T )[ ], z : T ⇒ out x〈z〉 : [ ]
x : Ch(y:T )[ ], P : e, y /∈ fn(e) ⇒ inp x(y:T );P : e
Next, we consider the type Ch(y:T )e of monadic channels with latent eﬀect
e. The latent eﬀect is a cost to senders, a beneﬁt to receivers, and is the scope
of the variable y. We assign an output out x〈z〉 the eﬀect e{y←z}, where
we have instantiated the name y bound in the type of the channel with z,
the name actually sent on the channel. We assign an input inp x(y:T );P the
eﬀect e− e, where e is the eﬀect of P . To avoid scope confusion, we require
that y is not free in e− e.
x : Ch(y:T )e, z : T ⇒ out x〈z〉 : e{y←z}
x : Ch(y:T )e, P : e, y /∈ fn(e− e) ⇒ inp x(y:T );P : e− e
The formal rules for input and output in the next section generalize these
rules to deal with polyadic channels.
Typing Conditionals When typing a conditional if x = y then P else Q,
it is useful to exploit the fact that P only runs if the two names x and y
are equal. To do so, we check the eﬀect of P after substituting one for the
other. Suppose then process P{x←y} has eﬀect eP{x←y}. Suppose also that
process Q has eﬀect eQ. Let eP ∨ eQ be the least upper bound of any two
eﬀects eP and eQ. Then eP ∨eQ is an upper bound on the begin-events needed
to precede the conditional to make it safe, whether P or Q runs. An example
in Section 4.2 illustrates this rule.
P{x←y} : eP{x←y}, Q : eQ ⇒ if x = y then P else Q : eP ∨ eQ
3.4 Typing Rules
Our typing rules depend on several operations on eﬀect multisets, most of
which were introduced informally in the previous section. Here are the formal
deﬁnitions.
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Operations on eﬀects: e+ e′, e ≤ e′, e− e′, L ∈ e, e ∨ e′
[L1, . . . , Lm] + [Lm+1, . . . , Lm+n]
∆
= [L1, . . . , Lm+n]
e ≤ e′ if and only if e′ = e+ e′′ for some e′′
e− e′ ∆= the smallest e′′ such that e ≤ e′ + e′′
L ∈ e if and only if [L] ≤ e
e ∨ e′ ∆= the smallest e′′ such that e ≤ e′′ and e′ ≤ e′′
The typing judgments of this section depend on an environment to assign
a type to all the variables in scope.
Environments:
E ::= x:T environment
dom(x:T )
∆
= {x} domain of an environment
To equate two names in an environment, needed for typing conditionals,
we deﬁne a name fusion function. We obtain the fusion E{x←x′} from E by
turning all occurrences of x and x′ in E into x′.
Fusing x with x′ in E: E{x←x′}
(x1:T1, . . . , xn:Tn){x←x′} ∆=
(x1{x←x′}):(T1{x←x′}); . . . ; (xn{x←x′}):(Tn{x←x′})
where E;x:T
∆
=
{
E if x ∈ dom(E)
E, x:T otherwise
The following table summarizes the ﬁve judgments of our type system,
which are inductively deﬁned by rules in subsequent tables. Judgment E  
means environment E is well-formed. Judgment E  T means type T is
well-formed. Judgment E  x : T means name x is in scope with type T .
Judgment E  〈x〉 : 〈y:T 〉 means tuple 〈x〉 matches the variable declaration
y:T . Judgment E  P : e means process P has eﬀect e.
Judgments:
E   good environment
E  T good type T
E  x : T good name x of type T
E  〈x〉 : 〈y:T 〉 good message x matching y:T
E  P : e good process P with eﬀect e
The rules deﬁning the ﬁrst three judgments are standard.
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Good environments, types, and names:
(Env ∅)
∅  
(Env x)
E  T x /∈ dom(E)
E, x:T  
(Type Name)
E  
E  Name
(Type Chan)
E, x:T   fn(e) ⊆ dom(E) ∪ {x}
E  Ch(x:T )e
(Name x)
E ′, x:T,E ′′  
E ′, x:T,E ′′  x : T
The next judgment, E  〈x〉 : 〈y:T 〉, is an auxiliary judgment used for
typing output processes; it is used in the rule (Proc Output) to check that
the message 〈x〉 sent on a channel of type Ch(y:T )e matches the variable
declaration y:T .
Good message:
(Msg 〈〉)
E  
E  〈〉 : 〈〉
(Msg x) (where y /∈ {y} ∪ dom(E))
E  〈x〉 : 〈y:T 〉 E  x : (T{y←x})
E  〈x, x〉 : 〈y:T , y:T 〉
Finally, here are the rules for typing processes. The eﬀect of a process is an
upper bound; the rule (Proc Subsum) allows us to increase this upper bound.
Intuitions for all the other rules were explained in the previous section.
Good processes:
(Proc Subsum) (where e ≤ e′ and fn(e′) ⊆ dom(E))
E  P : e
E  P : e′
(Proc Output)
E  x : Ch(y:T )e E  〈x〉 : 〈y:T 〉
E  out x〈x〉 : (e{y←x})
(Proc Input) (where fn(e− e′) ⊆ dom(E))
E  x : Ch(y:T )e′ E, y:T  P : e
E  inp x(y:T );P : e− e′
(Proc Cond)
E  x : T E  y : T E{x←y}  P{x←y} : eP{x←y} E  Q : eQ
E  if x = y then P else Q : eP ∨ eQ
(Proc Res) (where x /∈ fn(e))
E, x:T  P : e
E  new(x:T );P : e
(Proc Par)
E  P : eP E  Q : eQ
E  P | Q : eP + eQ
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(Proc Repeat)
E  P : [ ]
E  repeat P : [ ]
(Proc Stop)
E  
E  stop : [ ]
(Proc Begin) (where fn(L) ⊆ dom(E))
E  P : e
E  begin L;P : e− [L]
(Proc End) (where fn(L) ⊆ dom(E))
E  P : e
E  end L;P : e+ [L]
Section 5 presents our main type safety result, Theorem 5.2, that E  P : [ ]
implies P is safe. Like most type systems, ours is incomplete. There are safe
processes that are not typeable in our system. For example, we cannot assign
the process if x = x then stop else (end x; stop) the empty eﬀect, and yet it is
perfectly safe.
4 Applications
In this section, we present some examples of using correspondence assertions
to validate safety properties of communication protocols. For more examples,
including examples with cryptographic protocols which are secure against ex-
ternal attackers, see the companion paper [9].
4.1 Transmit-Acknowledge Handshake
Recall the untyped sender and receiver code from Section 2. Suppose we make
the type deﬁnitions:
Msg
∆
= Name Ack(a, b,msg)
∆
= Ch()[〈a, b,msg〉]
Host
∆
= Name Req(a, b)
∆
= Ch(msg :Msg , ack :Ack(a, b,msg))[ ]
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Suppose also that we annotate the sender and receiver code, and the code of
Example 1 as follows:
Snder(a:Host , b:Host , c:Req(a, b))
∆
=
new(msg :Msg);
new(ack :Ack(a, b,msg));
out c〈msg , ack〉;
inp ack();
end 〈a, b,msg〉
Rcver(a:Host , b:Host , c:Req(a, b))
∆
=
inp c(msg :Msg , ack :Ack(a, b,msg));
begin 〈a, b,msg〉;
out ack〈〉
Example1 (a:Host , b:Host)
∆
=
new(c:Req(a, b));
Snder(a, b, c) |
Rcver(a, b, c)
We can then check that a:Host , b:Host  Example1 (a, b) : [ ]. Since the system
has the empty eﬀect, by Theorem 5.2 it is safe. It is routine to check that
Example 2 from Section 2 also has the empty eﬀect, but that Example 3
cannot be type-checked (as to be expected, since it is unsafe).
4.2 Hostname Lookup
In this example, we present a simple hostname lookup system, where a client
b wishing to ping a server a can contact a name server query , to get a network
address ping for a. The client can then send a ping request to the address ping ,
and get an acknowledgement from the server. We shall check two properties:
• When the ping client b ﬁnishes, it believes that the ping server a has been
pinged.
• When the ping server a ﬁnishes, it believes that it was contacted by the
ping client b.
We write “a was pinged by b” as shorthand for 〈a, b〉, and “b tried to ping a”
for 〈b, a, a〉. These examples are well-typed, with types which we deﬁne later
in this section.
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We program the ping client and server as follows.
PingClient(a:Hostname, b:Hostname, query :Query)
∆
=
new(res : Res(a));
out query〈a, res〉;
inp res(ping : Ping(a));
new(ack : Ack(a, b));
begin “b tried to ping a”;
out ping〈b, ack〉;
inp ack();
end “a was pinged by b”
PingServer(a : Hostname, ping : Ping(a))
∆
=
repeat
inp ping(b : Hostname, ack : Ack(a, b));
begin “a was pinged by b”;
end “b tried to ping a”;
out ack〈〉
If these processes are safe, then any ping request and response must come
as matching pairs. In practice, the name server would require some data
structure such as a hash table or database, but for this simple example we
just use a large if-statement:
NameServer(
query :Query ,
h1:Hostname, . . . , hn:Hostname,
ping1:Ping(h1), . . . , pingn:Ping(hn)
)
∆
=
repeat
inp query(h, res);
if h = h1 then out res〈ping1〉 else · · ·
if h = hn then out res〈pingn〉 else stop
To get the system to type-check, we use the following types:
Hostname
∆
= Name
Ack(a, b)
∆
= Ch()[“a was pinged by b”]
Ping(a)
∆
= Ch(b:Hostname, ack :Ack(a, b))[“b tried to ping a”]
Res(a)
∆
= Ch(ping :Ping(a))[ ]
Query
∆
= Ch(a:Hostname, res :Res(a))[ ]
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The most subtle part of type-checking the system is the conditional in the
name server. A typical branch is:
hi : Hostname, ping i : Ping(hi), h : Hostname, res : Res(h)
 if h = hi then out res〈ping i〉 else · · · : [ ]
When type-checking the then-branch, (Proc Cond) assumes h = hi by apply-
ing a substitution to the environment:
(hi : Hostname, ping i : Ping(hi), h : Hostname, res : Res(h)){h←hi}
= (hi : Hostname, ping i : Ping(hi), res : Res(hi))
In this environment, we can type-check the then-branch:
hi : Hostname, ping i : Ping(hi), res : Res(hi)
 out res〈ping i〉 : [ ]
If (Proc Cond) did not apply the substitution to the environment, this example
could not be type-checked, since:
hi : Hostname, ping i : Ping(hi), h : Hostname, res : Res(h)
 out res〈ping i〉 : [ ]
4.3 Functions
It is typical to code the λ-calculus into the π-calculus, using a return channel
k as the destination for the result. For instance, the hostname lookup example
of the previous section can be rewritten in the style of a remote procedure call.
The client and server are now:
PingClient(a:Hostname, b:Hostname, query :Query)
∆
=
let (ping : Ping(a)) = query 〈a〉;
begin “b tried to ping a”;
let () = ping 〈b〉;
end “a was pinged by b”
PingServer(a : Hostname, ping : Ping(a))
∆
=
fun ping(b:Hostname) {
begin “a was pinged by b”;
end “b tried to ping a”;
return 〈〉
}
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The name server is now:
NameServer(
query :Query ,
h1:Hostname, . . . , hn:Hostname,
ping1:Ping(h1), . . . , pingn:Ping(hn)
)
∆
=
fun query(h:Hostname) {
if h = h1 then return 〈ping1〉 else · · ·
if h = hn then return 〈pingn〉 else stop
}
In order to provide types for these examples, we have to provide a function type
with latent eﬀects. These eﬀects are precondition/postcondition pairs, which
act like Hoare triples. In the type (x:T )e → (y:U)e′ we have a precondition
e which the callee must satisfy, and a postcondition e′ which the caller must
satisfy. For example, the types for the hostname lookup example are:
Ping(a)
∆
= (b:Hostname)[“b tried to ping a”]→ ()[“a was pinged by b”]
Query
∆
= (a:Hostname)[ ]→ (ping :Ping(a))[ ]
which speciﬁes that the remote ping call has a precondition “b tried to ping a”
and a postcondition “a was pinged by b”.
This can be coded into the π-calculus using a translation [18] in continu-
ation passing style.
fun f(x:T ) {P} ∆= repeat inp f(x:T , k:Ch(y:U)e′);P
let (y:U) = f 〈x〉;P ∆= new(k:Ch(y:U)e′); out f〈x, k〉; inp k(y:U);P
return 〈z〉 ∆= out k〈z〉
(x:T )e→ (y:U)e′ ∆= Ch(x:T , k:Ch(y:U)e′)e
This translation is standard, except for the typing. It is routine to verify its
soundness.
5 Formalizing Correspondence Assertions
In this section, we give the formal deﬁnition of the trace semantics for the
π-calculus with correspondence assertions, which is used in the deﬁnition of
a safe process. We then state the main result of this paper, which is that
eﬀect-free processes are safe.
We give the trace semantics as a labelled transition system. Following
Berry and Boudol [3] and Milner [18] we use a structural congruence P ≡ Q,
and give our operational semantics up to ≡.
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Structural Congruence: P ≡ Q
P ≡ P (Struct Reﬂ)
Q ≡ P ⇒ P ≡ Q (Struct Symm)
P ≡ Q,Q ≡ R⇒ P ≡ R (Struct Trans)
P ≡ Q⇒ inp x(y:T );P ≡ inp x(y:T );Q (Struct Input)
P ≡ Q⇒ new(x:T );P ≡ new(x:T );Q (Struct Res)
P ≡ Q⇒ P | R ≡ Q | R (Struct Par)
P ≡ Q⇒ repeat P ≡ repeat Q (Struct Repl)
P | stop ≡ P (Struct Par Zero)
P | Q ≡ Q | P (Struct Par Comm)
(P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R) (Struct Par Assoc)
repeat P ≡ P | repeat P (Struct Repl Par)
new(x:T ); (P | Q) ≡ P | new(x:T );Q (Struct Res Par) (where x /∈ fn(P ))
new(x1:T1); new(x2:T2);P ≡
new(x2:T2); new(x1:T1);P
(Struct Res Res)
(where x1 = x2, x1 /∈ fn(T2), x2 /∈ fn(T1))
There are four actions in this labelled transition system:
• P
begin L−−−−→ P ′ when P reaches a begin L assertion.
• P end L−−−→ P ′ when P reaches an end L assertion.
• P
gen 〈x〉−−−−→ P ′ when P generates a new name x.
• P τ−→ P ′ when P can perform an internal action.
For example:
(new(x:Name); begin 〈x〉; end 〈x〉; stop) gen 〈x〉−−−−→ (begin 〈x〉; end 〈x〉; stop)
begin 〈x〉−−−−−→ (end 〈x〉; stop)
end 〈x〉−−−−→ (stop)
Next, we deﬁne the syntax of actions α, and their free names and generated
names.
Actions:
α, β ::= actions
begin L begin-event
end L end-event
gen 〈x〉 name generation
τ internal
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Free names, fn(α), and generated names, gn(α), of an action α:
fn(τ)
∆
= ∅ fn(begin L)
∆
= fn(L) fn(end L)
∆
= fn(L) fn(gen 〈x〉) ∆= {x}
gn(τ)
∆
= ∅ gn(begin L)
∆
= ∅ gn(end L)
∆
= ∅ gn(gen 〈x〉 ∆= {x}
The labelled transition system P
α−→ P ′ is deﬁned here.
Transitions: P
α−→ P ′
out x〈x〉 | inp x(y);P τ−→ P{y←x} (Trans Comm)
if x = x then P else Q
τ−→ P (Trans Match)
if x = y then P else Q
τ−→ Q (Trans Mismatch) (where x = y)
begin L;P
begin L−−−−→ P (Trans Begin)
end L;P
end L−−−→ P (Trans End)
new(x:T );P
gen 〈x〉−−−−→ P (Trans Gen)
P
α−→ P ′ ⇒ P | Q α−→ P ′ | Q (Trans Par) (where gn(α) ∩ fn(Q) = ∅)
P
α−→ P ′ ⇒ new(x:T );P α−→ new(x:T );P ′ (Trans Res) (where x /∈ fn(α))
P ≡ P ′, P ′ α−→ Q′, Q′ ≡ Q⇒ P α−→ Q (Trans ≡)
From this operational semantics, we can deﬁne the traces of a process, with
reductions P
s−→ P ′ where s is a sequence of actions.
Traces:
s, t ::= α1, . . . , αn trace
Free names, fn(s), and generated names, gn(s), of a trace s:
fn(α1, . . . , αn)
∆
= fn(α1) ∪ · · · ∪ fn(αn)
gn(α1, . . . , αn)
∆
= gn(α1) ∪ · · · ∪ gn(αn)
Traced transitions: P
s−→ P ′
P ≡ P ′ ⇒ P ε−→ P ′ (Trace ≡)
P
α−→ P ′′, P ′′ s−→ P ′ ⇒ P α,s−→ P ′ (Trace Action) (where fn(α) ∩ gn(s) = ∅)
We require a side-condition on (Trace Action) to ensure that generated
names are unique, otherwise we could observe traces such as
(new(x); new(y); stop)
gen 〈x〉,gen 〈x〉−−−−−−−−→ (stop)
Having formally deﬁned the trace semantics of our π-calculus, we can deﬁne
when a trace is a correspondence: this is when every end L has a distinct,
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matching begin L. For example:
begin L, end L is a correspondence
begin L, end L, end L is not a correspondence
begin L, begin L, end L, end L is a correspondence
We formalize this by counting the number of begin L and end L actions there
are in a trace.
Beginnings, begins (α), and endings, ends (α), of an action α:
begins (begin L)
∆
= [L] ends (begin L)
∆
= [ ]
begins (end L)
∆
= [ ] ends (end L)
∆
= [L]
begins (gen 〈x〉) ∆= [ ] ends (gen 〈x〉) ∆= [ ]
begins (τ)
∆
= [ ] ends (τ)
∆
= [ ]
Beginnings, begins (s), and endings, ends (s), of a trace s:
begins (α1, . . . , αn)
∆
= begins (α1) + · · ·+ begins (αn)
ends (α1, . . . , αn)
∆
= ends (α1) + · · ·+ ends (αn)
Correspondence:
A trace s is a correspondence if and only if ends (s) ≤ begins (s).
A process is safe if every trace is a correspondence.
Safety:
A process P is safe if and only if for all traces s and processes P ′
if P
s−→ P ′ then s is a correspondence.
A subtlety of this deﬁnition of safety is that although we want each end-
event of a safe process to be preceded by a distinct, matching begin-event, a
trace st may be a correspondence by virtue of a later begin-event in t match-
ing an earlier end-event in s. For example, a trace like end L, begin L is a
correspondence.
To see why our deﬁnition implies that a matching begin-event must precede
each end-event in each trace of a safe process, suppose a safe process has a
trace s, endL, t. By deﬁnition of traces, the process also has the shorter trace
s, end L, which must be a correspondence, since it is a trace of a safe process.
Therefore, the end-event end L is preceded by a matching begin-event in s.
We can now state the formal result of the paper, Theorem 5.2, that every
eﬀect-free process is safe. This gives us a compositional technique for verifying
the safety of communications protocols. It follows from a subject reduction
result, Theorem 5.1. The most diﬃcult parts of the formal development to
check in detail are the parts associated with the (Proc Cond) rule, because of
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its use of a substitution applied to an environment.
Theorem 5.1 (Subject Reduction) Suppose E  P : e.
(1) If P
τ−→ P ′ then E  P ′ : e.
(2) If P
begin L−−−−→ P ′ then E  P ′ : e+ [L].
(3) If P
end L−−−→ P ′ then E  P ′ : e− [L], and L ∈ e.
(4) If P
gen 〈x〉−−−−→ P ′ and x /∈ dom(E) then E, x:T  P ′ : e for some type T .
Theorem 5.2 (Safety) If E  P : [ ] then P is safe.
6 Related Work
Correspondence assertions are not new; we have already discussed prior work
on correspondence assertions for cryptographic protocols [27,17]. A contribu-
tion of our work is the idea of directly expressing correspondence assertions
by adding annotations to a general concurrent language, in our case the π-
calculus.
Giﬀord and Lucassen introduced type and eﬀect systems [11,16] to man-
age side-eﬀects in functional programming. There is a substantial literature.
Early work on concurrent languages includes systems by Nielson and Niel-
son [19,20] and Talpin [24]. Recent applications of type and eﬀect systems
include memory management for high-level [26] and low-level [5] languages,
race-condition avoidance [7], and access control [23].
Early type systems for the π-calculus [18,22] focus on regulating the data
sent on channels. Subsequent type systems also regulate process behaviour;
for example, session types [25,12] regulate pairwise interactions and linear
types [15] help avoid deadlocks. A recent paper [6] explicitly proposes a type
and eﬀect system for the π-calculus, and the idea of latent eﬀects on channel
types. This idea can also be represented in a recent general framework for
concurrent type systems [14]. Still, the types of our system are dependent
in the sense that they may include the names of channels; to the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst dependent type system for the π-calculus. Another
system of dependent types for a concurrent language is Flanagan and Abadi’s
system [7] for avoiding race conditions in the concurrent object calculus of
Gordon and Hankin [8].
The rule (Proc Cond) for typing name equality if x = y then P else Q
checks P under the assumption that the names x and y are the same; we
formalize this by substituting y for x in the type environment and the process
P . Given that names are the only kind of value, this technique is simpler
than the standard technique from dependent type theory [21,2] of deﬁning
typing judgments with respect to an equivalence relation on values. Honda,
Vasconcelos, and Yoshida [13] also use the technique of applying substitutions
to environments while type-checking.
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7 Conclusions
The long term objective of this work is to check secrecy and authenticity prop-
erties of security protocols by typing. This paper introduces several key ideas
in the minimal yet general setting of the π-calculus: the idea of expressing
correspondences by begin- and end-annotations, the idea of a dependent type
and eﬀect system for proving correspondences, and the idea of using latent
eﬀects to type correspondences begun by one process and ended by another.
Several examples demonstrate the promise of this system. Unlike a previous
approach based on model-checking, type-checking correspondence assertions
is not limited to ﬁnite-state systems.
A companion paper [9] begins the work of applying these ideas to crypto-
graphic protocols as formalized in the spi-calculus of Abadi and Gordon [1],
and has already proved useful in identifying known issues in published proto-
cols. Our ﬁrst type system for spi is speciﬁc to cryptographic protocols based
on symmetric key cryptography. Instead of attaching latent eﬀects to channel
types, as in this paper, we attach them to a new type for nonces, to formalize
a speciﬁc idiom for preventing replay attacks. Another avenue for future work
is type inference algorithms.
The type system of the present paper has independent interest. It intro-
duces the ideas in a more general setting than the spi-calculus, and shows
in principle that correspondence assertions can be type-checked in any of the
many programming languages that may be reduced to the π-calculus.
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